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Washing Machines, Water Efficiency, and Federal Preemption:
California's Quest to Regulate Water Consumption Under the EPCA
California Energy Commission v. Department of Energy'
I. INTRODUCTION
California's distinct geo-climactic condition puts it in a
hydrologically disadvantaged position when compared with much of the
United States. Covering more than 155,000 square miles,2 the State's vast
size encompasses several varied climate classifications; ranging from
mild-Mediterranean in certain coastal areas to the dry Mojave Desert.3
This climactic diversity results in much of southern California being
dependent on an intricate aqueduct system that transports substantial
quantities of much needed water down from the aquifers in the north.4
Rainfall is limited,5 and that lack of precipitation is only exacerbated by a
water withdrawal rate that is over six times the national average-51
billion gallons per year versus 8 billion gallons per year.6 It was under
those strained circumstances that California's Legislature began the
process to establish new standards for improving the water efficiency on
both commercial and residential clothes washers. However, in order to
' 585 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2009).2 U.S. Census Bureau, State Quick Facts- California, available at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html.
3 John E. Kesseli, The Climates of California According to the Koppen Classification,
GEOGRAPHICAL REvIEw, vol. 32, no. 3, 476, 478 (Jul. 1942).
4 CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, CAL. GEOGRAPHY AND ITS WATER NEEDS (2008),
http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/geography.cfm (stating that northern California receives
the most rainfall and mountain snowpack runoff and, in order to support a heavily
populated and arid southern California, a system is needed to convey water supplies
down the state) (last visited April 4, 2010).
5 Over the past two years, large portions of California have been categorized by the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association ("NOAA") as at least "abnormally dry,"
and well over half of the state is considered "moderately" to "severely" dry. NOAA,
STANDARDIZED PRECIPITATION INDEX STUDY: FEB. 2008-JAN. 2010, available at
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/prelim/drought/spi.html.
6 CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, CAL. GEOGRAPHY AND ITS WATER NEEDS (2008),
available at http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/geography.cfin.
7 Cal. Energy Comm 'n, 585 F.3d at 1146.
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give legal effect to those standards, the legislature required the California
Energy Commission ("CEC") to petition the Department of Energy
("DOE") for a waiver of the federal standards that, due to the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act ("EPCA"), preempted any applicable state
law.8 Finding the petition critically deficient in three separate aspects, the
DOE rejected the petition.9 On direct appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, the Court found that the EPCA vested jurisdiction
over denials of waiver petitions in the circuit courts and, on review, the
DOE's rejection was arbitrary and capricious.' 0
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
California is in the midst of a water crisis that is further aggravated
by a rapidly growing population and a dwindling supply of water.II
Existing water sources have been steadily depleted by a combination of
over-appropriating and over-drafting the aquifers, salt-water
contamination, and environmental degradation.12 With no significant
alternative water supplies available, California has evaluated a variety of
potential solutions to better utilize the existing water supply.' 3 Some of
the methods pressed into service have included water recycling,
8 Id. It is expected that California's total population will increase by approximately 36
percent through 2025 thereby increasing the current population of 36 million to 49
million by 2025. See US CENSUS BUREAU, PROJECTIONS OF THE TOTAL POPULATIONS OF
THE STATES: 1995-2025, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/projections/state/stpjpop.txt.
9 Denial of California's Petition for Waiver of Preemption, 71 Fed. Reg. 78,157 (Dec. 28,
2006).
10 Cal. Energy Comm'n, 585 F.3d at 1150 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6306(b)(2) (2006)).
" Id. at 1146. See CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, MANAGING AN UNCERTAIN
FUTURE, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR CALIFORNIA'S WATER, at 3-4
(Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.water.ca.gov/climatechange/docs/ClimateChangeWhitePaper.pdf (stating that
the water supply is further reduced by the "[t]he average early spring snowpack in the
Sierra Nevada decreased by about 10 percent during the last century" and this loss is
expected to grow by 25 to 40 percent by 2050 and will significantly reduce the source of
the largest freshwater reservoir in California).
1 See Cal. Energy Comm'n, 585 F.3d at 1146.
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desalination, and increasing water efficiency.14  Of those options,
California has concluded that improved water efficiency is the most
promising means of alleviating its water crisis.15
In order to effectuate this movement toward higher water
efficiency, California enacted legislation requiring the CEC to establish
standards for residential clothes washers.' 6 Under this mandate, the CEC
adopted a two-tiered standard that centered on a particular clothes
washer's "water factor" ("WF").' 7  The WF standard is simply an
expression of the ratio of gallons of water used per load to the capacity, in
cubic feet, of the washtub.' 8 The standards were to apply to both top-
loading and front-loading washers, and were to be implemented using a
tiered system with two implementation dates.' 9 Tier 1, scheduled to take
effect on January 1, 2007, required that all washers were to perform with a
WF of no greater than 8.5.20 Tier 2, scheduled to take effect on January 1,
2010, required all washers to perform with a WF of no greater than 6.0.
Under the EPCA, federal standards expressly preempt any state
regulations pertaining to the energy efficiency, energy use, or water use of
any product.22 As a result, when federal energy efficiency standards for
residential clothes washers were adopted in 2001, the CEC's water
14 id
15 Id.
16 Id. The legislature's reason for focusing on residential clothes washers stemmed from
research that showed 22% of the water use in a typical household was from the operation
of the clothes washer. Id.17id
18 Id. For example, a washer that has a 5.0 cubic feet tub and uses 50.0 gallons of water
per load would have a WF of 10.0. Should that same 5.0 cubic feet tub instead use only
25.0 gallons of water per load, the WF would be 5.0.
19 Id
20 id.
2 Id. at 1146-47. With the implementation of these new standards, the CEC asserts that
the water savings would be equal to the City of San Diego's current water usage. Id.
22 42 U.S.C. § 6297 (2002). The type of preemption seen in this instance is "express
preemption" because Congress included explicit preemptive language in the statute. See
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 394 (Aspen
Publishers 2006). Federal preemption powers are derived from the supremacy clause in
Article VI of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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efficiency standards were effectively preempted.23 Cognizant of this
obstacle, the California Legislature directed the CEC to petition the DOE
for a rule waiving preemption of the federal standards. 24
In order to successfully obtain such a waiver, the CEC needed to,
among other things, demonstrate that the state regulation was necessary
"to meet unusual and compelling State or local water interests."25
Completed on December 23, 2005, the DOE outlined three separate
reasons for denial; each it considered independently sufficient for rejection
of the petition.26 First, the initial tier of the CEC's proposed regulation,
set to take effect on January 1, 2007, failed to meet the statutory three-year
minimum waiting period prior to implementation. 27 Second, the CEC "did
not meet the statutory standard, which requires a state to show unusual and
compelling water interests." 28  The CEC did not do this, the DOE
maintained, because the CEC did not support its cost-benefit analysis with
the underlying data that would have allowed the DOE to determine
whether the standard was satisfied. 29  Third, the CEC's proposed
regulation would make an entire class of clothes washers unavailable in
California.30
The CEC requested reconsideration of the DOE's decision and,
following thirty days of inaction by the DOE, the request was denied on
February 28, 2007." Having exhausted its remedies within the DOE, the
CEC filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.32 In its appeal, the CEC asserted that the DOE's
23 Cal. Energy Comm'n, 585 F.3d at 1147. This exemplifies Chief Justice John
Marshall's view of preemption when he stated: "[A]cts of the State Legislatures.. .which
interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress [are to be invalidated because] [i]n
every such case, the act of congress.. .is supreme; and the law of State though enacted in
the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,
82(1824).
24 Cal. Energy Comm'n, 585 F.3d at 1147.
25 42 U.S.C. § 6297(d)(1)(B)-(C) (2002).26 d
27 I.; 71 Fed. Reg. 78,157, 78,157.
28 Cal. Energy Comm'n, 585 F.3d at 1147; see also 71 Fed. Reg. 78,157, 78,157.
29 Cal. Energy Comm'n, 585 F.3d at 1147; see also 71 Fed. Reg. 78,157, 78,157.
30 Cal. Energy Comm'n, 585 F.3d at 1147; see also 71 Fed. Reg. 78,157, 78,157-58.
31 Cal. Energy Comm'n, 585 F.3d at 1147.
32 d
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rejection of its petition was arbitrary and capricious." In support of that
argument, the CEC argued that: (1) the DOE's requirement that there be
"strict parity" between the analysis submitted and the implementation
timeline was unworkable in practice;34 (2) the DOE's conclusion that the
CEC did not provide underlying analyses of its assumptions and data was
unsupported by the record;" and, (3) there was no "rational connection
between the facts found and the conclusions made" regarding the DOE's
finding that there would be an unavailability of top-loading washers. 6 In
response, the DOE first asserted that the Ninth Circuit lacked
jurisdiction." According to the DOE, the EPCA required the CEC to
initially seek review in federal district court.38 Second, should jurisdiction
lie properly with the Ninth Circuit, the DOE argued that any of the three
reasons it articulated for denial of the petition could independently support
their action under the applicable standard of review.3 9
In its decision the Ninth Circuit found that, contrary to the DOE's
assertion, jurisdiction was properly evoked under the EPCA and the CEC
was not required to first seek review in federal district court.40 Next, the
court systematically evaluated each of three reasons for denial given by
the DOE and found the rejection of the CEC's petition to be "arbitrary and
capricious." 4 1 Thus, the decision made by the DOE was reversed and the
issue remanded for further, more proper consideration of the waiver
petition filed by the CEC.4 2
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
3 3Id. at 1152.
34
3s Id. at 1153.
36 Id. at 1154 (quoting Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 858 n.36 (9th Cir.
2003)).
3 Id. at 1147-48.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1151.
4Id. at 1150.
41 Id. at 1151-54.
42 Id. at 1155.
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A. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act 4 3
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 was the
legislative result of the devastating energy crisis that gripped the United
States in the early 1970's." Among the primary objectives of the EPCA
was to "establish a comprehensive national energy policy" that would
maximize domestic energy production, establish a strategic reserve, and
reduce domestic energy consumption.45 Put into practice, the EPCA
provided for everything from the "creation of a Strategic Petroleum
Reserve capable of reducing the impact of severe supply interruptions," to
"provid[ing] for improved energy efficiency of motor vehicles, major
appliances, and certain other consumer products."46 Included in the
extensive list of "major appliances" governed by the EPCA are furnaces,
water heaters, clothes washers, and clothes dryers.47
Upon the adoption of a federal energy conservation standard, the
EPCA explicitly stipulated that no state regulation "concerning the energy
efficiency, energy use, or water use of such covered product shall be
effective" unless the regulation has been granted a waiver by the DOE.48
Obtaining a waiver to regulate any EPCA covered product for which there
is already federal energy conservation standards requires the state to file a
petition with the Secretary of the DOE to give the regulation effect.49
Following consideration of the petition and an appropriate notice and
43 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (2006).
4 In response to American support for Israel in the Yom-Kippur War of 1973, the
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OAPEC") and its parent
organization, the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC"), dealt a
crippling financial blow to the United States through the implementation of a sweeping
oil embargo and the institution of punishing price fixing measures. See H.R. REP. No.
94-340, at 2-3 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1762, 1763-65.
45 S. REP. No. 94-516, at 2 (1975) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1956,
1957.
46 42 U.S.C. § 6201.
471 d § 6292(a)(4)-(8).
48 Id § 6297(c)(2). Regardless of whether the federal government decides to regulate
only water use, energy efficiency or energy use on a specific covered product, once those
standards are in place, individual states are completely preempted from establishing any
energy or water standards on that product.
49 Id. § 6297(d)(1)(A).
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comment period, the DOE will only grant the waiver petition if the state
has established by a preponderance of the evidence "that the state
regulation is needed to meet unusual or compelling State or local energy
or water interests."50 Nonetheless, even if the state establishes such
"unusual or compelling" interests, the DOE will still reject the petition if
interested persons establish that the state's regulation will "significantly
burden manufacturing, marketing, distribution, sale, or servicing of the
covered product on a national basis." 5'
In the case that a party is aggrieved or adversely affected by a rule,
the EPCA gives two avenues of review.52 The first avenue gives the
adversely affected party the right to petition the United States court of
appeals for the circuit in which the person resides, or has her principal
place of business, for judicial review of a rule prescribed under §§ 6293-
6295.53 Alternatively, if a party would like to determine if a state or local
government is in compliance under the EPCA, such review may be sought
in the United States district courts.54
In 2001, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6295, the DOE adopted energy
efficiency standards for residential clothes washers.55  Despite not
prescribing water efficiency standards for residential clothes washers, the
DOE's promulgation of energy efficiency standards expressly preempted
state agencies from regulating the energy or water efficiency of that
56appliance.
50 A state's interests will be considered "unusual and compelling" if they are: (1)
substantially different in nature or magnitude than those prevailing in the United States
generally; and (2) are such that the costs, benefits, burdens, and reliability of energy or
water savings resulting from the regulation outweigh the costs, benefits, burdens, and
reliability of alternative approaches. Id. § 6297(d)(1)(B)-(d)(1)(C)(ii).
' Id. § 6297(d)(3). An interested person is anyone that takes the time to comment
following the notice of proposed rulemaking. The interested persons meet their burden if
they do so by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
2 42 U.S.C. § 6306(b).
1 Id. § 6306(b)(1). Section 6293 concerns testing procedures, section 6294 concerns
labeling, and section 6295 concerns energy conservation standards.
54 Id. § 6306(c)(1). Section 6306(c)(2) also allows review in the district courts when a
petition is filed to have the DOE change national energy efficiency standards for a
covered product and the petition is denied. Id. § 6306(c)(2).
s 10 C.F.R. § 430.32(g) (2009).
16 42 U.S.C. § 6297(c)(2).
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B. California Statutes and Regulations
In 2002, the California Legislature required the CEC to promulgate
water efficiency standards for both commercial and residential clothes
washers. 57  The CEC was able to adopt energy and water efficiency
standards for commercial clothes washers without preemption difficulties
because they were not covered by a federal regulation.5 8  However, in
regards to residential washers, the CEC promulgated the aforementioned
two-tier standards with implementation dates of January 1, 2007 and
January 1, 2010.59 Yet, for those regulations to become enforceable, the
CEC was instructed to petition the DOE for a rule waiving preemption. 60
That petition was the subject of the instant case.
C. Jurisdictional Issues and the EPCA
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Abraham ("Abraham") is
the most important case to evaluate the propriety of jurisdiction in cases
involving the EPCA.6' In Abraham, the DOE was required to either
approve or modify congressionally established energy efficiency standards
for central air conditioning units. 62 Yet, to modify the congressionally
established standards, Congress required that the standard adopted by the
DOE "achieve the maximum improvement in energy efficiency" that is
determined to be technologically and economically feasible. 63  Also,
Congress installed an "anti-backsliding" mechanism, codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 6295(o)(1), that forbid the DOE from promulgating standards which
were less stringent than those established by prior federal legislation. 64
s7 Cal. Energy Comm'n, 585 F.3d at 1146.
58 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 20 § 1605.3(p)(1) (2010).
s9 Id. § 1605.2(p)(1).
60 2002 Cal. Stat. ch. 421.
61355 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2004).
62 1d. at 186-87.
63 Id. at 187 (quoting National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-12, sec. 5, § 325(1)(2)(A), 101 Stat. 103, 114 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
6295(o)(2)(A)).
6 Id. at 187-88 (citing S. REP. No. 100-6, at 2 (1987)).
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Initially, on January 22, 2001, the DOE proposed a conforming
rule that was to become effective on February 21, 2001.65 However, prior
to enactment, the proposed rule's effective date was delayed and the DOE
issued a new rule stating that it intended to withdraw and revisit the
standards set forth in the January 22nd proposed rule.66  Following a
public comment period and public hearing, the DOE promulgated a new
rule that instituted more lenient efficiency standards than had been put
forward in the January 22nd proposed rule. 67 In response, multiple parties
filed petitions for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit and also in the District Court for the Southern District of New
York.68 Those parties sought appellate review of both the DOE's decision
to postpone the effective date of the already published rule and also its
decision to implement less restrictive standards. 69  The district court
summarily dismissed the petitions due to a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and held that the EPCA granted jurisdiction to the appellate
courts. 70 The Second Circuit, in order to determine whether jurisdiction
was proper, consolidated the petitions already before it with the appeal and
petitions for relief dismissed by the district court.
The court first looked to the EPCA and found that, although §
6306 vested jurisdiction in the appellate courts for actions relating to §§
6293-6295, a persuasive argument could be made that the district courts
had jurisdiction on the basis of general federal question jurisdiction.72
65 Id. at 189.66 Id. at 190. The effective date of the rule was delayed by an order issued by President
George W. Bush's Chief of Staff, Andrew Card. It required that all federal regulations
already published in the Federal Register, but not yet effective, be postponed for a period
of sixty days. Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Dep'ts and




70 Id. at 191 (citing New York v. Abraham, 199 F. Supp. 2d 145, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
' Id.
72 Id. at 192 (quoting Clark v. Commodity FuturesTrading Comm'n, 170 F.3d 110, 113,
n. 1 (2d Cir. 1999)) (noting that the petitioners relied on the well-established precedent
that "District Courts, unlike courts of appeals, require no further statutory authority to
hear appeals from agency decisions than the federal question jurisdiction set forth at 28
U.S.C. § 1331.").
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Nevertheless, the court held that whenever there is a specific statutory
grant of jurisdiction to the court of appeals, it should be construed in favor
of review by the court of appeal.73 Moreover, the court found the statutory
structure of § 6306 favored finding jurisdiction in the court of appeals
because the EPCA provided that most acts undertaken by the DOE
regarding home appliances are subject to review by the courts of appeals.74
Lastly, the court held that "rulemaking proceedings do not ordinarily
necessitate additional fact-finding by a district court to effectuate the
review process."75 This is in stark contrast to the fact-finding that, in the
court's opinion, would need to take place when evaluating state
compliance with the EPCA-situations that are explicitly vested in the
district courts by § 6303.76 As a result, the Second Circuit held that
jurisdiction was proper in the court of appeals.
Another case that weighed jurisdictional considerations in close
statutory interpretation cases was Public Citizen, Inc. v. National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration ("Public Citizen").78 In that case, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether jurisdiction belonged to the
district court or court of appeals following denial of a petition for a "an
order prescribing a motor vehicle safety standard" under the Safety Act.79
At issue was a petition filed by a group of tire-makers requesting that the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") raise the
manufacturer's recommended tire pressure that was printed on individual
tires.so The NHTSA denied the rulemaking petition and the tire-makers
appealed to the D.C. Circuit.8 '
73 Id. at 193 (citing Clark, 170 F.3d at 114); see also Nat'1 Parks & Conservation Ass'n v.
FAA, 998 F.2d 1523, 1529 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that if any ambiguity exists as to
whether jurisdiction lies with a district court or a court of appeals, it should be resolved in
favor of review by the court of appeals).
74 Abraham, 355 F.3d at 193.
75 Id. at 193; see also Fla. Power & Light v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985).
76 Abraham, 355 F.3d at 193-94.
77 Id.
78 489 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
'Id. at 1287.
'o Id. at 1286.
81 Id.
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Much like the EPCA, the Safety Act vested jurisdiction in the
courts of appeals when such an order is issued.82 However, as the court
reasoned, there is a stark difference between the NHTSA prescribing an
order, which is directly reviewable by the courts of appeal, and the
NHTSA simply denying a petition to initiate a proceeding to consider
orders or rules.83 The D.C. Circuit held that the statute clearly dictated
that review of "NHTSA's denial of a petition for rulemaking must begin in
district courts-not in courts of appeals." 84
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Ninth Circuit's evaluation in California Energy Commission v.
Department of Energy primarily turned on two issues. First, the court
determined that it properly had jurisdiction under the EPCA. Second,
the court found that none of the reasons cited by the DOE were sufficient
for denial of the CEC's petition and were therefore arbitrary and
capricious. 86
A. Jurisdiction
The crux of the DOE's jurisdictional argument was that the EPCA
did not specifically place jurisdiction in the Appellate Courts for issues
concerning the denial of a waiver sought pursuant to § 6297(d). As a
result, the DOE argued, judicial review should have originated in federal
district court as prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA").88 The court was not persuaded. First, the Ninth Circuit noted
that although § 6306 did not specifically list § 6297(d) in its enumeration
of issues that may be raised initially before an appellate court, that was not
2 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 30161(a) (2006)).
3 Id.
4 Id.
85 Cal. Energy Comm'n v. Dep't ofEnergy, 585 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009).
86 id.
" Id. at 1148.
88 Under the APA, absent a specific statutory provision to the contrary, review of agency
action is typically located in the District Courts. Id. (citing Owner-Operators Indep.
Drivers Ass'n v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 582, 585 (9th Cir. 1§91)); 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2006).
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enough to simply infer Congress intended default jurisdiction to lie in the
district courts for all other challenges.8 9  Under the EPCA, the court
observed, jurisdiction was specifically vested in the district courts for two
categories of action: suits to determine state compliance with
requirements of the EPCA, and suits challenging the denial of rulemaking
to amend a product standard. 90 Thus, the court argued that if Congress
had intended jurisdiction to vest in the district courts for all challenges
other than direct challenges to rules adopted, then those specific
jurisdictional grants to the district courts would appear unnecessary.9 '
Instead, the court reasoned that the EPCA simply allocated certain groups
of cases to be decided first by the district courts and another group of
cases to be decided first by the appellate courts.92 When a matter is
unlisted, "considerations of efficiency, consistency with the congressional
scheme, and judicial economy may be employed to determine whether
initial review in the circuit courts best accomplishes the intent of
Congress." 93 In the instant case, the court believed those considerations
militated in favor of jurisdiction in the appellate court.94
In support of its belief that courts must make considerations of
practicality and ensure consistency with Congress' intent, the Ninth
Circuit looked to the Second Circuit's decision in Abraham.95 In that case,
the Second Circuit held that a sharp distinction should be drawn between
"[r]ulemaking proceedings [which] do not ordinarily necessitate additional
fact-finding by a district court to effectuate the review process" and "the
exceptions to review by a court of appeals found in § 6303 [which]
ordinarily would entail additional fact-finding, as they do not reflect the
culmination of a structured rulemaking process with its attendant
89 id.
9 Id.
91 Id. See generally Estate of Bell v. Comnn'r, 928 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1991)
("Congress is presumed to act intentionally and purposely when it includes language in
one section but omits it in another.").
92 Cal. Energy Comm'n, 585 F.3d at 1148.
93 Id. (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 741-45 (1985)).
94 id
9 Id. at 1149.
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record."96 Applying that standard to the present case, the Ninth Circuit
found that the DOE's denial of a waiver of preemption resulted in a full
record upon which the agency deliberated and no further fact-finding was
necessary. 97 Holding otherwise, the court believed, would create a system
of duplicity whereby the district courts and appellate courts would review
the same record under the same legal standards. 98
Next, the court rejected the DOE's reliance on Public Citizen. In
Public Citizen, the D.C. Circuit held that, although orders prescribing a
motor vehicle standard are reviewable in the first instance by the courts of
appeal, denials of requests to initiate proceedings to consider orders are
not available for direct appellate review.100 The circumstances in Public
Citizen, the Ninth Circuit believed, were substantially different and
actually provided support for jurisdiction.' 0' The court held that the policy
considerations relied on in Public Citizen were analogous to the reasoning
of Abraham because original jurisdiction in the appellate court was denied
when the agency had refused to act and no record whatsoever had been
compiled.' 0 Without such a record, the court reasoned, any appellate
court would find it impossible to determine whether the agency had acted
legally. 03 A district court, with its fact-finding capability, was a more
appropriate venue. 104 In the instant case, the court found a fully developed
record and, as a result, the type of review the court would engage in was
no different than the sort it would engage when reviewing a rule
promulgated under § 6295-a section the court was expressly assigned
jurisdiction over by the EPCA.'os
Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it properly had jurisdiction
to consider the CEC's petition for review.




Id. at 1150; Public Citizen, Inc. v. Nat'1 Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d
1279 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
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B. The DOE's Rejection of the CEC's Petition was
Arbitrary and Capricious
In evaluating the DOE's rejection of the CEC's petition, the Ninth
Circuit first looked at the DOE's reliance on the three-year waiting period
as a reason for denial.106 The EPCA establishes a mandatory three-year
delay between the date of the DOE's grant of a waiver and the date on
which the state standard takes effect.' 07  Since the CEC's petition
contained a tiered implementation strategy, with the first standard taking
effect on January 1, 2007, the DOE held that the CEC's petition failed for
lack of adherence to the waiting period. 08 The Ninth Circuit found that
reasoning unacceptable.109 The court pointed out that the DOE did not
even accept the petition as complete until December 23, 2005, and did not
rule upon it until December 28, 2006.'"0 Because the DOE does not
generally provide a specific date by which a waiver petition will be ruled
upon, the court believed the DOE needed to infuse a level of flexibility so
that those petitioning entities might be able to better estimate a starting
date."' Furthermore, the court noted that the DOE made no attempt to
apply the data provided by the CEC and evaluate a permissible
implementation date.112  Consequently, the Ninth Circuit rejected the
DOE's contention that it could simply reject the waiver petition because
the first implementation date was not outside the three-year waiting
period.' 13 Such a system, the court held, created an unworkable schematic
1o6Id. at 1151.
107 Id. No final rule prescribed by the DOE under the waiver provisions may permit any
state regulation to become effective with respect to any covered product within three
years after such rule is published in the Federal Register. 42 U.S.C. 6297(d)(5)(A)
(2006).
108 Cal. Energy Comm'n, 585 F.3d at 1151. Specifically, the DOE found that the January
2007 implementation date would fail the three-year lead-time requirement and California
did not show what impact a revised effective date would have on the data and analyses
provided to the DOE. Denial of California's Petition for Waiver of Preemption, 71 Fed.
Reg. 78,157, 78,160 (Dec. 28, 2006).
109 Cal. Energy Comm'n, 585 F.3d at 1151.
11o Id.
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framework that was contrary to common sense, and thus arbitrary and
capricious.114
The Ninth Circuit next looked at the DOE's second ground for
denial of the CEC's petition." 5 The DOE's second reason for denial was
that "the CEC had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that
the State of California has unusual and compelling water interests" as
required by the EPCA.116 To satisfy that standard, the CEC was required
to demonstrate that California had: (1) interests in saving water that are
substantially different than those prevailing in the United States generally;
and (2) the costs, benefits, burdens, and reliability of energy or water
savings resulting from the state regulation made such state regulation
preferable or necessary when balanced against alternative approaches.11 7
The DOE found the CEC met the first requirement in showing that
California's water interests were "substantially different in magnitude than
those prevailing in the U.S. generally."" 8 However, the DOE thought the
CEC did not show how its standards were preferable or necessary when
compared to alternative approaches.119 The DOE's support for this
conclusion was rooted in its belief that the CEC failed to provide the
underlying analysis of its assumptions and data inputs, and because of
that, the DOE was unable to determine if the petition met EPCA
requirements.120
In rejecting this analysis, the Ninth Circuit found that the CEC had
done its part and provided a full explanation of its data and assumption in
the form of its own rulemaking record.121 The DOE itself, in its notice
114 Id. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning on this issue tracks closely with the First Circuit's
decision in Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co. v. EPA, 8 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 1993). In that case, the
First Circuit found an EPA rejection of a discharge permit to have been arbitrary and
capricious because the EPA's stringent reliance on its own procedural rules were
insufficient to support the denial without an adequate rationale for its actions. Id. at 78-
79. A bit tongue-in-cheek, the court declared "It may come as a surprise that agency
decisions must make sense to reviewing courts." Id. at 77.
"s Cal. Energy Comm'n, 585 F.3d at 1152.
"
6 Id. at 1153.
" Id. at 1152-53 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6297(d)(1)(C)(i)-(ii).).
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soliciting comment, referred readers to the website at which the CEC's
rulemaking record could be found.122 Moreover, the court noted that the
DOE's own regulations require that it accept as complete "only such
petitions which conform to the requirements of [DOE's regulations] and
which contain sufficient information for the purposes of a substantive
decision."' 23  Thus, the court concluded that the CEC had provided
sufficient data and analysis for the DOE to make a decision and the DOE
simply did not evaluate them.124 As a result, the court held the DOE's
reliance on its second ground for denying the petition for waiver was
arbitrary and capricious.
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit looked to the DOE's third reason for
rejecting the CEC's petition. That final reason centered on the DOE's
assertion that if the CEC's waiver petition was granted, the 6.0 WF
standard for top-loading washers would likely result in the unavailability
of top-loading residential washers in California.126  This, the DOE
asserted, precluded the approval of the waiver because the EPCA requires
denial of a waiver if "interested persons have established, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the State regulation is likely to result
in the unavailability in the State of any covered roduct type (or class) of
performance characteristics, features, sizes...."l2
The court found the DOE's reasoning flawed.128 In holding that
top-loading washers would be made unavailable, the DOE relied on
comments that no top-loading residential clothes washers existed in the
current market that could comply with the 6.0 WF level of the proposed
California regulation.129 This, the court held, was wholly insufficient. In
order to adequately show by a preponderance of the evidence that the state
regulation is likely to result in the unavailability of top-loading washers,
the DOE could not simply point to the current unavailability. o It was
122 id
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necessary, according to the court, for the DOE to weigh evidence of future
availability of top-loaders that would meet such a standard. 1' The CEC
presented evidence pertaining to that point, but, as the court noted, the
DOE did not conduct an analysis of that evidence.' 32 The DOE's failure
to address the CEC's evidence of the probable capability of top-loading
washers in the future was a "clear error of judgment," and thus the court
found it to be arbitrary and capricious.' 33
V. COMMENT
A. Legal Analysis
The Ninth Circuit correctly found that Congress intended
decisions, such as the denial of waiver petition, to be directly reviewed by
the courts of appeal. With a fully developed record already in place, it
would be redundant and a waste of limited judicial resources to initially
vest review in the district courts. Furthermore, in light of the ill-supported
and dismissive reasoning relied on by the DOE, the court was correct in
finding that the rejection of the waiver petition was arbitrary and
capricious. In so finding, the court has helped ensure that the DOE will
follow the legislative intent of Congress and give individual states the full
and fair hearing to which they are entitled when petitioning for a waiver of
preemption.
B. Cooperative Federalism and the Future of California's Water
Preservation
Increasingly popular over the last forty years, cooperative
federalism is essentially a form of governance that divides authority
between various jurisdictions.134  One of the underlying principles of




134 Christina E. Wells, Katrina and the Rhetoric ofFederalism, 26 Miss. C. L. REv. 127,
130 (2006).
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minimum standards, but will leave the states discretion to alter them.13 5
Traditionally, environmental law has favored an arrangement where the
federal government will establish a minimum standard by statute or
regulation and, after meeting certain conditions, states are allowed to enact
more stringent standards.136 Persons in favor of cooperative federalism in
this context believe that it excels in providing much needed deference to
state officials who are better positioned to tailor federal regulatory
schemes to local conditions.' 37  An excellent model for the beneficial
operation of cooperative federalism has been the Clean Air Act.
Similar to the EPCA, the Clean Air Act of 1970138 ("CAA") was
passed to increase environmental stewardship and improve the nation's air
quality.139  However, unique to the CAA is the duality of standards
inserted into to it by Congress in regards to motor vehicle emissions.
While federal standards would still preempt any conflicting state
standards, California alone is given the option to request a preemption
waiver in order to set its own standards.140 If California requests a waiver
under that provision, the Administrator of the EPA is to grant the waiver
so long as: (1) the state standards are at least as protective as the federal
standards; (2) the determination of the state is not arbitrary or capricious;
(3) the state standards exist to meet compelling and extraordinary
circumstances; and (4) the state standards and enforcement are consistent
with the federal standards.141 Following approval of the preemption
waiver, other states may choose to either adopt the more stringent
California standard or simply remain under the federal standard.142
135 id
136 Id. The other model for cooperative federalism is seen in programs such as Medicaid
where a federal agency "develop[s] certain standards for state agencies to follow when
implementing the federal statutory scheme that provides federal funding for the states."
Id. (quoting Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REv. 663, 668 (2001)).
137 Wells, supra note 132, at 130-3 1.
138 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2006).
139 d. § 7401.
140 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)-(b). California is the only state which meets § 7543(b)(1)'s
requirement for obtaining a waiver because it was the only state which had standards in
lace prior to March 30, 1966. See S. Rep. No. 90-403 at 632 (1967).
141 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(l)-(2).14 21Id § 7543(b)(3).
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What this feature has done under the CAA is allow California,
historically progressive on environmental issues, to serve as a laboratory
for tighter emissions controls while allowing sister states to decide
whether such standards would be beneficial to their respective populaces.
Should a state find that the more stringent California standards would be
prohibitively expensive to implement, or would yield only modest positive
results, that state is free to simply adhere to the federal standards. Thus
far, fifteen states and the District of Columbia have chosen to adopt the
California standards.143 Overall, the CAA, with its cooperative federalism
framework and structural flexibility towards California, has been effective
in steadily reducing the levels of the six major air pollutants and
increasing national air quality.144
It would seem self-evident that a similar urgency should be
exhibited in the preservation of our water supply as has been demonstrated
in improving the quality of the air we breathe. In light of the success
realized under the CAA, California should advocate for and Congress
should legislate a provision into the EPCA comparable to the one in the
CAA. Not only would it allow California to serve at the forefront of
another major environmental issue, but it would also give other states and
the federal government the opportunity to evaluate the efficacy of more
stringent efficiency standards. 45 As the nation's most populous state,14 6
and one of the largest markets for consumer goods,14 7 California is a large
143 See PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, VEHICLE GREENHOUSE EMISSIONS
STANDARDS, http://
www.pewclimate.org/whatsbeingdone/inthe-states/vehicle_ghg standard.cfin (last
visited Apr. 5, 2010). States that adopt the California standards are known as "CARB"
States because the California Air Resources Board is the institution responsible for
promulgating California's standards. Id.
'" EPA, OUR NATION'S AIR: STATUS AND TRENDS THROUGH 2008, available at
http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/2010/index.html.
145 See Ann E. Carlson, Energy Efficiency and Federalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 63, 68
(2008) (stating that replicating the regulatory scheme used under the CAA would be a
workable option under the EPCA because of the past successes realized under the CAA).
146 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NAT'L AND STATE POPULATION ESTIMATES: 2000-2009,
available at http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html.
147 CAL. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CAL. TRADE FACTS, available at
http://www.calchamber.com/international/trade/pages/tradestatistics.aspx; U.S. CENSUS
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enough segment of both the market and society that it would serve as an
ideal test subject for new standards while avoiding the production of the
fragmented standards feared by opponents of cooperative federalism in
environmental legislation. 148 Moreover, the waiver petition process itself
would encourage further dialog in the field of environmental regulation by
states that might not otherwise be interested. Each time California would
present an argument in its waiver petition for new standards, those
arguments would have to be analyzed and either supported or rejected by
other states. As multiple states begin to adopt the California efficiency
standards under this revised version of the EPCA, it would also assuage
any fear that the federalization of environmental law is leading to a
"ceiling mentality" where federal standards are not the minimum, but
instead the maximum the states may require.149
With the way in which the EPCA is presently codified, Congress
does not need to take drastic action to afford California the same privilege
it has under the CAA. The standard for any state to be granted a
preemption waiver under the EPCA is strikingly similar to the standard, as
outlined above, for the CAA. Congress would simply have to enact a
provision similar to § 7543(b)(3) in the CAA that allows for other states to
either adopt the California standard or remain under the federal
standards.'10 Also, to give added strength to that provision, the DOE
should give substantial deference to California's petition waivers. Such
deference is not unusual and would be reflective of the deference
California is given under the CAA. An example of that deference was
recently seen when the EPA was asked by the Obama Administration to
reevaluate a prior decision rejecting a petition for waiver of preemption
under the CAA.15 1 Following receipt of that request, the EPA changed
BUREAU, NAT'L AND STATE POPULATION ESTIMATES: 2000-2009, available at
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html.
148 See Michael Burger, Empowering Local Autonomy and Encouraging Experimentation
in Climate Change Governance: The Case for a Layered Regime, 39 ENVTL. L. REP.
NEWS& ANALYSIS 11161, 11167 (Dec. 2009).
149 Id. (stating that many in the environmental law community believe that federal
preemption places a ceiling on environmental standards and thus limits the potential for
future reductions.)
"s 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(3) (2006).
151 Presidential Memorandum to Admin'r of the EPA, 74 Fed. Reg. 4905 (Jan. 26, 2009).
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course and granted California's waiver petition, stating that "Congress
intended EPA's review of California's decision-making be narrow."1 52
Were California's requests for waiver preemption under the EPCA given
such deference, it would be a significant step toward streamlining the
waiver process and allowing California to serve as a vehicle to improve
efficiency standards.
C. Application to and Recommendations for Missouri
Traditionally, Missouri is a state that is associated with Mark
Twain inspired visions of riverboats traversing the mighty Missouri and
Mississippi Rivers throughout the late 18th and early 19th centuries. For
many years the strength of Missouri's economy has been intertwined with
its intimate connection to those rivers, and in the 21st century those rivers
are still integral to the future success of the State. With so much of
Missouri's viability connected to those rivers, it is important to note that
neither river originates in Missouri and the bulk of their respective river
systems are well beyond Missouri's borders.153 In fact, Missouri is the last
state to share the flow of both the upper Mississippi and Missouri rivers.154
Without increased water efficiency standards implemented, it is probable
that upstream states with earlier access to those river systems will desire to
draw more water from those limited bodies as their populations and
agricultural production increase.155
152 Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California's
2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor
Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744, 32,747 (July 8, 2009).
153 The headwaters to the Missouri River are located in Montana and the river flows
through Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska prior to crossing into
Missouri. Similarly, the Mississippi River cuts down the eastern border of Missouri as it
makes its way from Minnesota to the Gulf of Mexico. See UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY, LARGEST RIVERS IN THE UNITED STATES, available at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1 987/ofr87-242/pdflofr87242.pdf.
154 JERRY D. VINEYARD, Mo. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, STATE WATER PLAN
SERIES, VOLUME VI, WATER RESOURCE SHARING: THE REALITIES OF INTERSTATE RIVERS
1 (1997), available at http://www.dnr.mo.gov/pubs/WR50.pdf.
1ss Id. When the White River is added to the mix, Missouri shares the flows of it, the
Missouri River, and the Mississippi River with 19 other states.
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Historically, Missouri has been blessed with adequate rainfall and
plentiful supplies of groundwater.156 That is not to say, however, that
Missouri has been immune from water shortages and drought. Most
recently, from July 1999 through the summer of 2000 many parts of
Missouri experienced drought conditions.' 5 7  Several community water
reservoirs reached dangerously low levels and agricultural areas
throughout the northern portions of the State were hit especially hard .158
Although the drought began only as a "supply drought," commonly
characterized by a lack of precipitation to replenish and maintain the
levels of surface and ground water, it nearly became a "water use drought"
as a result of human activity using more water than was available.' 59
With Missouri's own susceptibility to future water shortages, it
should take a more proactive approach on issues concerning water use and
efficiency. Although California is well positioned to carry the mantle on
the water efficiency issue, support from a state that is outside the
traditionally arid Southwest would be invaluable to serve notice that water
conservation principles are also a key focus in the Midwest. Missouri
could be a leader in that regard. On issues such as water efficiency in
clothes washers, Missouri could provide assistance in the form of
supportive comments during the petition for a waiver of preemption
process. If, as happened in California Energy Commission v. Department
of Energy,160 the case ends up in the court of appeals, Missouri could file
an amicus curiae brief supporting California's changes.1 6 1 Lastly, the
Missouri delegation in the U.S. Congress could introduce legislation to
modify the EPCA to give states the same level of cooperative federalism
seen in the CAA, thus allowing willing states to adopt California's more
156 Mo. DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES, MISSOURI DROUGHT PLAN 9 (2002), available at
http://www.dnr.mo.gov/pubs/WR69.pdf.157 Id. at preface.
158 id.
159 Id. at 2. Supply droughts and water use droughts can often occur simultaneously due
to dwindling supply and an uptick in water use due to any number of societal or
environmental factors. Id.
160 585 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2009).
161 As a state, Missouri may file an amicus curiae brief without consent of the parties or
leave of the Court. FED. R. CIv. P. 29.
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stringent standards. Taking these actions would allow Missouri to not
only recite, but also live its Water Conservation Ethic:
Water conservation begins at home. We have a serious responsibility to
use water conservatively, so that those downstream from us may share to
the same extent that we share the rivers that flow into Missouri from up-
stream states. It is not OUR water; it belongs to the entire Earth, endlessly
renewed through the hydrologic cycle.1 62
VI. CONCLUSION
As concerns over what effects a growing worldwide population
will have on the limited natural resources available, it is critical that a
good amount of flexibility be built into the environmental regulatory
framework so that local answers might eventually solve global problems.
Allowing California to innovate and legislate tighter standards that are
narrowly tailored to the unique needs of their climactic situation can only
serve to raise the bar for the remainder of the country as more states look
to those improvements and decide to follow them. The present system of
standards promulgated by the federal government is not obsolete; it just
needs to be adjusted to confront today's challenges. The standards put in
place in Washington, D.C. should remain to serve as the floor which no
state or industry may venture below. Nevertheless, by allowing California
to remain in its leadership position on environmental issues under a
scheme akin to the CAA, efficiency in a variety of industries will improve
and will further national environmental objectives.
KAMERON M. LAWSON
162 JERRY D. VINEYARD, MISSOURI STATE WATER PLAN SERIES, VOLUME VI, WATER
RESOURCE SHARING: THE REALITIES OF INTERSTATE RIVERS 20, available at
http://www.dnr.mo.gov/pubs/WR50.pdf.
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